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VA. CODE ANN. §

19.2-264.5*

L Introduction
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 governs capital sentencing proceedings in
Virginia.' During sentencing, the jury may impose the death penalty only if the
Commonwealth proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating factor. 2 If the jury returns a death verdict, the court may
set aside the sentence and impose life. 3 The judge may do so, pursuant to
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5, "[alfter consideration of the [postsentence]
report, and upon good cause shown."' 4 The requirement of cause limits the trial
judge's discretion to impose life.' At the same time, section 19.2-264.5 gives
capital defendants the same right as those charged with misdemeanor and other
6
felony offenses to request that the trial judge reduce the jury's sentence.
In early February 2003 a Pittsylvania County jury convicted Roy Douglas
7
Inge of capital murder in the slaying of a deputy police officer. The jury deliber8
ated for an hour and twenty minutes and recommended a sentence of death. On
April 24,2003, after reviewing the presentencing report,Judge William Alexander
9
concluded that the death penalty should not be imposed. Despite the jury's
recommendation, Judge Alexander took an unusual step and imposed a life

*

H.D. 755, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004) (amending § 19.2-264.5).

1.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2004).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (stating that "[t]he penalty of death shall not be
2.
imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt... that [the defendant]
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,
or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile"); see also Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that statutory aggravating factors that raise the maximum punishment effectively to death are elements of the offense and must be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 2004) (stating that the court may set aside a
3.
death sentence upon review of the postsentence report and impose a life sentence).
Id
4.
5.
See Basset v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 844, 854 (Va. 1981) (rejecting defendant's
argument that § 19.2-264.5 "unconstitutionally discriminate[d] against him because its good cause
upon him a heavier burden in reducing a capital verdict than in reducing a nonprovision impose [d]
capital verdict" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
6.
7.
Jamie C. Ruff, MurdererReceives life Sentence, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 25, 2003,
at B1.
Id
8.

9.

Id.
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sentence with little to no explanation.) Apparently in response to the Inge case,
the Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5."
II. Discussion
As noted above, the trial judge is the final word in the Virginia deathsentencing proceeding. Even if the jury finds a statutory aggravator beyond a
reasonable doubt and determines after consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances that death is warranted, the trial judge can override that
determination for good cause. 2 Prior law did not require the judge to explain his
reason for setting aside the jury's determination that death should be imposed. 3
However, in 2004 the Assembly added to section 19.2-264.5 the following
provision: "[I]f the court sets aside the sentence of death and imposes a sentence
of imprisonment for life, it shall include in the sentencing order an explanation
for the reduction in sentence."' 4
III. Anaysis
The legislative history of section 19.2-264.5 does not reveal the motivation
for the amendment. On its face, however, the new language prevents trial courts
from arbitrarily ignoring jury determinations that death is the appropriate sentence. Although some research suggests that capital juries frequently misunderstand statutory sentencing standards and begin to consider what punishment to
impose even prior to the penalty phase, the role of the jury in the criminal justice
system remains sacrosanct.'1 Community participation in the criminal process
ensures that the government does not exert an unchecked power over a defendant's fate.' 6 The jury's limit on such arbitrary power is particularly important
when a defendant's life is at stake.' 7
However, the concern represented by the amended language cannot be that
a judge will arbitrarily impose death but rather that he will arbitrarily impose life.
At the same time, because the Commonwealth cannot appeal the judge's final
determination, the requirement that the judge explain the reduction in sentence
10.
Id Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse records indicate that judges have overridden jury
recommendations of death under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 in only three other cases.
11.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 2004).
12.
Id
13.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie Supp. 2003).
14.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 2004).
15.
William J. Bowers, The CapitalJuyProject:Rationak, Design,and Prvnew ofEar#Finings,70
IND.L.J. 1043, 1087, 1090-93 (1995).
16.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 482 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
added that "community participation is 'critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system.'" Id (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
17.
I at 483.

2004]
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serves little purpose. At most, the provision will dissuade the judge from acting
out of emotion without first explaining his decision.
The statutory language and case law suggest the same conclusion. The
Supreme Court ofVirginia has consistently dismissed defendants' claims that trial
courts improperly exercised their discretion when they refused to override jury
recommendations of death.'" The court has invariably found that evidence did
not establish good cause for disturbing the jury's determination. 9 Although the
court has not defined "good cause," the amended section 19.2-264.5 impliedly
requires that trial judges state in writing the good cause upon which they base any
decision to impose life over the jury's recommendation of death. '
Virginia has no equivalent requirement of explanation for the finding that
death should be imposed. Under the Virginia procedure, the jury does not reveal
anything about the factual basis for its decision except the statutory aggravating
factor or factors that it found. 2' The judge, in turn, does not have to explain the
refusal to override a jury's determination-2
Other capital jurisdictions require greater transparency in the decision to
impose the death penalty. Under Florida law, for example, the trial court is the
ultimate sentencing authority.23 A jury weighs the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and makes an initial sentencing recommendation.24 The judge
then enters the final sentencing order.2' By statute, the judge is required to set
forth his findings explicitly as to the statutory aggravating and mitigating circum-

18. See Bassett,284 S.E.2d at 854 (finding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in refusing to reduce the defendant's sentence because the trial judge had heard the evidence twice
and "recognized the aggravating factors and looked for mitigating factors, but found none");
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 306,312 (Va. 2001) (concluding "that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion indeclining to change the sentence set by the jury"); Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219,226-27 (Va. 1995) (finding that, based upon the evidence presented to the
trial court, including "Chandler's mitigation evidence, the post-sentence report, a victim impact
statement, and the testimony of a deputy sheriff and the probation officer who prepared the postsentence report," the trial court did not err in its determination that there was insufficient good
cause to set aside the jury's verdict of death).
19. See, e.g., Bassett, 284 S.E.2d at 854 (finding that the trial court properly concluded that
evidence did not establish good cause for disturbing the jury's determination that death should be
imposed); Yarbroagh, 551 S.E.2d at 312 (same); Chandler,455 S.E.2d at 227 (same).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 2004).
21.

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D) (Michie 2004).

22. See Bassett, 284 S.E.2d at 854 (finding that the trial judge, who heard the evidence twice,
and who made statements at sentencing that demonstrated that he recognized aggravating factors
and looked for mitigating factors but found none, properly exercised his discretion in refusing to
reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment).
23. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 310 (1991).
24. Id at 313.
25. Id.
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stances." In addition, in 1990 the Supreme Court of Florida required that trial
court sentencing orders expressly evaluate each nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.2 7 In the federal system, the Federal Death
Penalty Act (CFDPA")' requires that a jury make relatively detailed special
findings. 9 For example, inJones v. UnitedStates,° a case decided under FDPA, the
special findings form returned by the jury included the statutory and nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances along with a list of eleven statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating factors found by the jury.3
Because Virginia law does not require the same scrutiny of the decision to
impose death, the amended section 19.2-264.5 creates an imbalance. The statutory requirement of explanation favors a judge's decision to uphold a jury's
finding that death should be imposed. Given the paucity of decisions like Judge
Alexander's, however, the amended language may get little use.
VI. Conclusion
The 2004 amendment of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5 requires that a
trial judge, at a minimum, state his reasons for disregarding a jury's recommended
sentence of death. At most, the requirement might protect the trust that communities place in the jury system by requiring that a judge not override a jury's
determination without reasoned consideration. Notably however, a sentence of
death in Virginia is accompanied by little explanation.

Jessica M. Tanner

26.
Id at 317; see FLA. STAT.ANN. § 921.141 (3) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring "specific written
findings of fact based upon [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances").
27.
Dugger, 498 U.S. at 317; see Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419-20 (Fla. 1990)
(addressing the problem that state courts did not uniformly address mitigating circumstances under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) and providing guidelines that required the sentencing court to
expressly evaluate in its written sentencing order, each mitigating circumstance proposed by the
defense); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (3) (West 1985) (requiring "specific written findings of fact
based upon [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances").
28.
Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591-3598 (2000).
29.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000).
30.
527 U.S. 373 (1999).
31.
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,377 n. 1, 378-79 n.3-4 (1999). In addition, the form
included the number of jurors that found each of the mitigating factors. Id at 378 n.4.

